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Bibliography

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  2. Bohnet, Iris, Frey, Bruno S. and Huck, Steffen, "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust and Crowding" (July 7, 2000). KSG Working Paper No. 00-009. http://ssrn.com/abstract=236476
  3. Budescu, David V., Rapoport, Amnon, and Suleiman, Ramzi. 1992. Simultaneous vs. sequential requests in resource dilemmas with incomplete information. Acta Psychologica. 80, 297-310.
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  5. Cassidy, Ralph, Jr.. 1967.Auctions and Auctioneering, University of California Press.
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