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						 The following section is intended for intermediate/upper intermediate students who are familiar with optimization techniques. It summarizes the differences between the market and Pareto efficient outcomes in mathematical form. 
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						 The individual i chooses how much of the public good to buy on his own ( i) to maximize his utility ui(x, yi) from consuming the public good x and private consumption yi, taking contributions of others as given (x-i). The consumer's problem can be then written as follows
:
 
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						 max ui(x, yi) = ui(x-i +  i, yi) subject to constraints  i, yi   0 and to p. i + yi   m,  
where p denotes the price of one unit of the public good and m denotes the value of i-th person initial endowment or income. 
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						 First order conditions:
MRSi   p, and MRSi = p if   > 0. 
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						 Suppose a unit of public good costs   and the consumer i has a utility function of the following form:
  
ui(x, yi) = yi +  ilog x    for all i = 1,...,n. 
Then MRSi =  i / x  
Let A =  i i and  * = max { i | i   N }. 
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						 Pareto Efficiency:
  
 MRSi = p  
i.e.,   ( i / x) =   
(1 / x) A =   
x´ = A /  , where x´ is the Pareto efficient outcome.
 
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						 Market Outcome:
  
MRSi   p =  , for all i 
i.e.,  i / x   p, for all i 
i.e., x    i / p, for all i.
  
Let's examine when an idividual purchases positive amount of public good  
MRSi = p if  i > 0, i.e., x =  i /  .  
From this follows that  i = 0 if  i <  * = max { i | i   N }, and xm =  * /   , where xm denotes the market outcome.
  
Note that  * << A and therefore, xm << x´, meaning that the market outcome is severly inefficient. 
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