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Economic Category: Auctions

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Auctions - Article

1. Auctions

Lists several auction types and briefly discusses the effect known as the winner's curse. [Details...]

2. Going, Going, Gone! A Survey of Auction Types

One of the best ways to allocate goods and/or resources is to sell them using free market techniques and ideas. An auction is an excellent method of distributing goods to those who value them most highly. Auctions, however, are far more complex than most people realize. Kate Reynolds has developed a series of articles for Agorics, explaining different auction types and some of the issues important in determining whether to use auctions and, if so, which kind. What exactly is an auction? You may think you already know. Then again . . . [Details...]

3. The Bidding Game

This article discusses the development of auction theory and the modern use of auctions. [Details...]

Auctions - Experiment Software

4. Auction with Mix of Common and Private Values

This program implements an auction in which each bidder's value for a prize is the sum of an individual-specific component (the private value) and a common component (the common value). [Details...]

5. Buyer's Curse Acquisition Auction

This program runs a set of two-person "takeover games" in which one makes a bid to acquire an object that is owned by the other. [Details...]

6. Call Market

This program runs a call market in which buyers and sellers submit bids and offers. These bids and offers are arrayed into "pseudo" demand and supply curves, which are "crossed" to determine a provisional trading price. The market is called and all provisional trades are finalized when the experimenter submits a close decision. At that time, all units with offers below the clearing price are sold, and all units with bids above the clearing price are purchased. The program calculates the theoretical competitive price for comparison. [Details...]

7. Common Value Auction

This program implements a first price common value auction in which each bidder receives a random draw from a uniform distribution. The value of the prize is the average of these draws, so each bidder only sees a part of the common value. [Details...]

8. Double Auction Market

This program runs a double auction in which buyers and sellers submit bids and offers in any order. [Details...]

9. ESL One-Sided Auctions

This software provides several types of one-sided auctions, including: 1. English; 2. Dutch; 3. First-price sealed bid; and 4. Second-price sealed bid. The software allows any combination of these auction types within a single experiment. Further, each auction type can be customized by the use of many parameter settings. [Details...]

10. Private Value Auction

This program implements a private-value auction. In each period, all bidders receive random private values that are independent draws from a uniform distribution (which permits a common deterministic value as a special case). [Details...]

11. Seller Reserve Price Auction

This program implements two-sided private-value auctions in which one person in each group is a seller who sets a (public or secret) reserve price. The remaining people are bidders. [Details...]

12. Water Auction

This program sets up an auction in which the bidders are "farmers" with multiple irrigation permits that can either be used (to earn money farming) or sold to the "state" at auction. The state has set aside funds to buy irrigation permits with the goal of reducing irrigation during a designated "draught" year. The state is interested in obtaining the maximum irrigation reduction for a given expenditure, so the lowest bids to sell permits are accepted. There may also be a maximum accepted bid, based on political or strategic considerations. Since permits pertain to various sized plots of land, all bids are submitted on a per-acre basis. As the experimenter, you represent the state. You can specify a target number of acres to be taken out of irrigation, a maximum amount of money to be spent, and a maximum bid. The program determines the permits which will be purchased, subject to the constraints of not acquiring more than the target number of acres, not accepting bids above the maximum, and not spending more than the budget. Bidding takes place in a series of "rounds." In each round, the state announces which permits would have been purchased had that been the final round (given the target acres, maximum bid, and budget constraints). Bidders do not know in advance which will be the final round. As the experimenter, you set the maximum number of rounds, but the auction may stop earlier if the acreage target can be met within budget (to disable this feature, set a high target). [Details...]

Auctions - Online Book

13. Auctions: Theory and Practice

This book is a non-technical introduction to auction theory; its practical application in auction design (including many examples); and its uses in other parts of economics. It can be used for a graduate course on auction theory, or by picking selectively an advanced undergraduate or MBA course on auctions and auction design. [Details...]

Auctions - Experiment Software Configuration

14. EFG Trust/ultimatum 6 round

[Details...]

15. EFG ultimatum only 3 round

[Details...]

16. EFG Trust only 3 round

[Details...]

17. EFG ultimatum only

[Details...]

18. EFG Trust Game Only

[Details...]

19. Market Link

[Details...]

20. dfd3

[Details...]

21. dfd6

[Details...]

22. dfd9

[Details...]

23. dsd3

[Details...]

24. dsd6

[Details...]

25. dsd9

[Details...]

26. fdf3

[Details...]

27. fdf6

[Details...]

28. fdf9

[Details...]

29. sds3

[Details...]

30. sds6

[Details...]

31. sds9

[Details...]

32. ICV-Comp1-DA

This is a configuration for a MarketLink double auction experiment that tests the predictions of the competitive market model. The marginal cost and marginal revenue curves for this configuration are identical to those in ICV-Duop1-DA and ICV-Monop1-DA so that competitive, duopolistic, and monopolistic models can be compared directly. [Details...]

33. ICV-Comp1-PO

This is a configuration for a MarketLink posted offer experiment that tests the predictions of the competitive market model. The marginal cost and marginal revenue curves for this configuration are identical to those in ICV-Duop1-PO and ICV-Monop1-PO so that competitive, duopolistic, and monopolistic models can be compared directly. [Details...]

34. ICV-Duop1-DA

This is a configuration for a MarketLink double auction experiment that tests the predictions of the duopoly market model. The marginal cost and marginal revenue curves for this configuration are identical to those in ICV-Comp1-DA and ICV-Monop1-DA so that competitive, duopolistic, and monopolistic models can be compared directly. [Details...]

35. ICV-Duop1-PO

This is a configuration for a MarketLink posted offer experiment that tests the predictions of the duopoly market model. The marginal cost and marginal revenue curves for this configuration are identical to those in ICV-Comp1-DA and ICV-Monop1-DA so that competitive, duopolistic, and monopolistic models can be compared directly. [Details...]

36. ICV-Monop1-DA

This is a configuration for a MarketLink double auction experiment that tests the predictions of the monopoly market model. The marginal cost and marginal revenue curves for this configuration are identical to those in ICV-Comp1-DA and ICV-Duop1-DA so that competitive, duopolistic, and monopolistic models can be compared directly. [Details...]

37. ICV-Monop1-PO

This is a configuration for a MarketLink posted offer experiment that tests the predictions of the monopoly market model. The marginal cost and marginal revenue curves for this configuration are identical to those in ICV-Comp1-DA and ICV-Duop1-DA so that competitive, duopolistic, and monopolistic models can be compared directly. [Details...]

38. ICV-Monop2-DA

Double auction monopoly experiment. [Details...]

39. ICV-Monop2-PO

[Details...]

40. ICV-Comp2a-PO

[Details...]

41. ID-PS1-DA

This is a configuration file for a double auction asset market experiment. There are three states that determine dividends for two trader types. There is no private information in this market, so the prices and allocations can be compared to the private information equilibrium. [Details...]

42. ID-SSW-DA

This is a configuration file for a double auction asset market experiment. This is known as the "asset bubble" experiment, because there is typically a run up in the asset price above its fundamental value in the middle of the experiment, with the run up in price followed by a crash in the asset price. [Details...]

Auctions - Non-computerized experiment

43. An EPA-Style Auction of Pollution Permits

This exercise simulates a Chicago Board of Trade auction of allowances to emit sulfur dioxide, one of the pollutants which causes acid rain. The CBOT began running these auctions in March of 1993 on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA uses the auctions as part of a market-based program to cut power company emissions of sulfur dioxide in half between the years 1990 and 2000. This simulation demonstrates the cost savings from using the market-based approach versus requiring an across- the-board cut in emissions. [Details...]

44. Pollution Rights Trading Game

A classroom game can be played to demonstrate to students the natural incentives companies have to compare costs of pollution reduction to the cost of obtaining the right to pollute. The appeal is that students often have trouble accepting the concept of an optimal pollution level and have no trouble arriving at one through market forces. [Details...]

45. Selling Seats Through An English Auction

The experimental auction highlights the importance of property rights in undergirding the market process. The auction is conducted on the first day that the class meets. The auction process and outcome provides a concrete example of how markets work and an opportunity to relate this to a variety of topics discussed in principles of economics. [Details...]

46. Sunk Cost and Marginal Cost: An Auction Experiment

The concepts of sunk and marginal costs can be difficult to get across to students. To do so, I employ an experiment that involves auctioning dollar bills in class. I tell the students that I will be auctioning dollar bills the next class period and to bring change if they are interested in participating. I impress upon them: there is no catch, I will be auctioning off genuine U.S. one dollar bills, each bill will be sold to the highest bidder, and I will auction off at least two dollar bills--more if there is sufficient interest. [Details...]

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