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Experiment Software



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1.
ESL OneSided Auctions
This software provides several types of onesided auctions, including: 1. English; 2. Dutch; 3. Firstprice sealed bid; and 4. Secondprice sealed bid. The software allows any combination of these auction types within a single experiment. Further, each auction type can be customized by the use of many parameter settings. [Details...]


2.
Common Value Auction
This program implements a first price common value auction in which each bidder receives a random draw from a uniform distribution. The value of the prize is the average of these draws, so each bidder only sees a part of the common value. [Details...]


3.
Private Value Auction
This program implements a privatevalue auction. In each period, all bidders receive random private values that are independent draws from a uniform distribution (which permits a common deterministic value as a special case). [Details...]




6.
Water Auction
This program sets up an auction in which the bidders are "farmers" with multiple irrigation permits that can either be used (to earn money farming) or sold to the "state" at auction. The state has set aside funds to buy irrigation permits with the goal of reducing irrigation during a designated "draught" year. The state is interested in obtaining the maximum irrigation reduction for a given expenditure, so the lowest bids to sell permits are accepted. There may also be a maximum accepted bid, based on political or strategic considerations. Since permits pertain to various sized plots of land, all bids are submitted on a peracre basis. As the experimenter, you represent the state. You can specify a target number of acres to be taken out of irrigation, a maximum amount of money to be spent, and a maximum bid. The program determines the permits which will be purchased, subject to the constraints of not acquiring more than the target number of acres, not accepting bids above the maximum, and not spending more than the budget. Bidding takes place in a series of "rounds." In each round, the state announces which permits would have been purchased had that been the final round (given the target acres, maximum bid, and budget constraints). Bidders do not know in advance which will be the final round. As the experimenter, you set the maximum number of rounds, but the auction may stop earlier if the acreage target can be met within budget (to disable this feature, set a high target). [Details...]


7.
Call Market
This program runs a call market in which buyers and sellers submit bids and offers. These bids and offers are arrayed into "pseudo" demand and supply curves, which are "crossed" to determine a provisional trading price. The market is called and all provisional trades are finalized when the experimenter submits a close decision. At that time, all units with offers below the clearing price are sold, and all units with bids above the clearing price are purchased. The program calculates the theoretical competitive price for comparison. [Details...]



9.
Seller Reserve Price Auction
This program implements twosided privatevalue auctions in which one person in each group is a seller who sets a (public or secret) reserve price. The remaining people are bidders. [Details...]


10.
Voting Game
This program sets up a situation in which each person is a voter in a committee meeting or election. The voters must choose between a fixed number of alternatives. These alternatives can be thought of as either candidates or committee decisions. The alternatives will be labeled A, B, etc., unless you specify other labels. [Details...]


11.
Common Pool Resource Game
This program sets up a multiperson game in which each person chooses an "effort" that represents a resource extraction activity (e.g. fishing). The resource is taken from a common pool in the sense that a person's share of the harvest equals their share of the total effort. [Details...]


12.
Rent Seeking Lobbying Game
This program sets up a multiperson game in which each person chooses a lobbying "effort" that represents real resources used in an attempt to obtain a prize (e.g. a broadcasting license). [Details...]



14.
Normal form Game software
This software allows normalform game experiments to be conducted over the Internet. Within an experiment, subjects participate in one or more matches. Each match is a series of one or more stage games. Several methods of rematching subjects between matches are offered. [Details...]


15.
Coordination Game
This program sets up a game in which each person chooses an "effort". Players are matched in groups of a specified size, and the payoff for each person is the minimum effort made by people in their group (including themselves). There is a cost of effort, which is a constant amount per unit of effort, and each person must pay the cost of their own effort. Thus the payoff is the minimum effort minus a unit cost times one's own effort. Efforts are required to be greater than or equal to a specified lower bound, and to be less than or equal to an upper bound.
[Details...]


16.
Centipede Game
This program sets up a centipede game in which two players make a series of decisions in alternating order. At each stage in the series, the player who has the decision must choose to Stop or Continue. The process continues until one person chooses to stop or until the final stage is reached. Payoffs are determined by the stage in which the process stops. The person who chooses Stop earns more than the other person, but payoffs typically increase with successive stages. [Details...]


17.
2x2 Matrix Game
This program sets up a twoplayer, twodecision matrix game. Pairings may be fixed (same in all rounds) or randomly reconfigured after each round. You choose the number of rounds and each player's payoffs for each of the four possible outcomes. [Details...]


18.
Large Matrix Game
This program sets up a twoplayer, multidecision matrix game, which allows asymmetries. Pairings may be fixed (in all periods) or randomly reconfigured after each round. [Details...]


19.
Traveler's Dilemma Game
This program sets up a game in which each person chooses a "claim". Players are matched in groups of a specified size, and the payoff for each person is the minimum claim made by people in their group (including themselves). [Details...]


20.
Two Stage Game
This program sets up a twoplayer, twostage game in which one player moves first and the other follows. You specify the number or rounds, with pairings that may be fixed (same in all periods) or randomly reconfigured after each round. You also choose numbers of decisions, their names for each player, and the players' payoffs for each of the possible outcomes. [Details...]


21.
Signaling Game (a.k.a. Beer/Quiche Game)
This program runs a set of twoperson signaling games in which one person (the proposer) observes the true state of nature and makes a decision. The other person (responder) sees the proposer's decision but not the state, and makes a response. [Details...]


22.
ComLabGames Strategic Form Game
The module is based on a matrix representation of two player strategic form games. Using the game editor, the moderator determines the choices that characterize the set of pure strategies, the naming of the strategies and the two players, as well as the payoffs for each possible outcome of the game. Games are run from the edit mode, too. The moderator can view the history of participation by subjects and their choices, plus some basic statistics describing the games played. Both of these are continuously updated as the session proceeds. The results and the summary statistics are saved in an "html" file that can be imported into a spreadsheet or opened with a browser. [Details...]



24.
Didactic WebBased Experiments in Game Theory
This site is based on the perception of game theory as the study of a set of considerations used by individuals in strategic situations. The goal is to deliver a loud and clear message that game theoretic models are not meant to supply predictions of strategic behavior in real life. [Details...]


25.
Bertrand Price Competition Game
This program sets up a multiperson game in which each person chooses a price in a Bertrand game with linear demand and constant marginal cost. The game highlights severe competitive pressures when there are several sellers. [Details...]


26.
Cournot Quantity Competition Game
This program sets up one or more markets in which each person is a seller who chooses a production quantity. This is a Cournot game with linear demand and constant marginal cost. The game can be used to motivate discussion of the Nash/Cournot predictions. There may be tacit collusion with few sellers and fixed matchings, and there may be severe competitive pressures when there are several sellers. [Details...]


27.
Market Entry Game
This program sets up a multiperson game in which each person chooses whether or not to enter a market. The payoff for all people who enter is a decreasing function of the number of entrants, and the payoff for not entering is a constant. The incentives are typically such that each person would prefer to enter if the others are unlikely to do so, and would prefer to stay out if the others are likely to enter. [Details...]


28.
Posted Offer Double Market
This program runs a onesided auction in which sellers post prices independently on a takeitorleaveit basis at the start of each market period or "round." Buyers then place orders at the posted prices. The program collects and displays price information. The "admin" module calculates the theoretical competitive price for comparison. [Details...]


29.
Verticle Monopoly Market
This program uses an interactive webbased interface to run a set of vertically related markets, as described in a 2003 discussion paper: "Double Monopoly: A Classroom Experiment," by Narine Badasyan, Jacob Goeree, Monica Hartmann, Charles Holt, John Morgan, Tanya Rosenblat, and Dirk Yandell. The first mover (wholesaler) in each group selects a wholesale price, and the second movers (retail monopolists in local markets) choose their whole purchase quantities and retail price levels. The equilibrium for vertically related monopolists produces a quantity restriction, even relative to a vertically integrated monopolist, and therefore, the vertical integration "solution" can be implemented in a second treatment option. A third treatment option lets the wholesaler set a wholesale price and a fixed franchise fee, which in theory, can also "solve" the vertical monopoly problem. [Details...]


30.
LotteryChoice Experiment with a ProbabilityBased Choice Menu
This program sets up a series of singleperson lottery choices designed to evaluate the effects of payoff scale variations. The probability of the higher payoff in each lottery is systematically varied in a manner that facilitates inferences about the degree of risk aversion. Lottery choices are arrayed in order as the probability of the high payoff is incremented. [Details...]



32.
Probability Matching Experiment
This program sets up an individual decision problem in which the subject must guess which of two random events will occur. The probability of the more likely event is specified by the experimenter but unknown to the subject, who learns through repeated trials. The program also allows specification of a monetary reward for a correct guess and a smaller reward (or penalty) for an incorrect guess. In addition, there is a hypothetical ("do your best") treatment option. Finally, you specify the number of trials and an initial fixed payment. [Details...]


33.
Sequential Search Experiment
This program sets up a singleperson decision problem in which the subject pays a cost for each random draw from a specified uniform distribution of prize values. This is a standard sequential search problem. The search sequence stops when a draw is accepted, and the payoff is the accepted draw minus the product of the search cost and the number of purchased draws. The exercise consists of three parts, each with a specified number of search sequences. The search cost and other treatment variables may be different for each part. [Details...]


34.
Information Cascade Experiment
This program sets up a sequential decisionmaking task in which each person obtains a private signal about which of two events has occured ("Red" or "Blue") and must make a public prediction of the event. [Details...]


35.
Statistical Discrimination
Participants are divided into equal numbers of "workers" and "employers," with half of the workers being "green" and half "purple." At the beginning of each round, each worker sees a random cost of investment, which is an independent draw from a uniform distribution on [0, 100]. This cost draw is private information. [Details...]



37.
Search Program
Singleperson program for conducting experiments regarding sequential consumer search with relative ranks. It is a free software distributed under the General Public License. The licensees have the legal permission to copy, distribute, either verbatim or with modifications, either gratis or for a fee. [Details...]


38.
Framing Effects
This online experiment will ask you to indicate your prefences over potential outcomes of two scenarios. When you have completed the experiment, your results and a discussion will be presented. [Details...]


39.
The Allais Paradox
This online experiment will ask you to indicate your prefences over two sets of potential gambles. When you have completed the experiment, your results and a discussion will be presented. [Details...]


40.
The Ellsberg Paradox
This online experiment will ask you to indicate your prefences over two sets of potential gambles. When you have completed the experiment, your results and a discussion will be presented. [Details...]


41.
Principal/Agent Game
This program runs a set of "Principal/Agent" games. The first mover (employer) makes a contract offer, and the second movers (worker) chooses whether to accept the contract. A worker who accepts a contract then chooses an effort level, which is costly to the worker but which benefits the employer. The possible contracts include fixed wage payments, along with possible ex post bonuses, monitoring, penalties, and/or profit sharing. If the contract only specifies a required fixed wage and an optional bonus, then the Nash equilibrium for selfish preferences in a oneshot game is to offer the minimum possible effort, since the wage is paid irrespective of effort. Efforts may be higher with fixed matchings or if participants are concerned with fairness and reciprocity. A number of contract options based (based on penalties and rewards) are also available. The game highlights issues of contract incentives, reciprocity, and strategy. [Details...]


42.
Bayes' Rule Probability Elicitation
This program sets up an individual decisionmaking task in which each person obtains a private signal about which of two events has ocurred ("Red" or "Blue") and must report a probability for one of the events. Earnings are structured so that the optimal decision is to report one's true subjective probability, in a DeGroot/Marshack type of mechanism. This setup allows one to evaluate the extent to which reported probabilities match those implied by Bayes' rule. [Details...]


43.
Lemons Market Program
This program runs a market in which sellers select prices and quality "grades" independently on a takeitorleaveit basis at the start of each period or "round." Buyers shop in a random sequence and place orders at the posted prices. Buyers observe quality grades prior to purchase in the fullinformation treatment, but quality is not observed in the asymmetricinformation treatment. A higher grade raises seller costs and buyer values. The program collects and displays price and quality information and calculates the theoretical competitive price for the surplusmaximizing grade. Market efficiency is measured as the fraction of maximum possible value created by the trading process, i.e. the ratio of the sum of all buyers' and sellers' earnings to the maximum possible value of this sum. [Details...]


44.
Public Goods (Voluntary Contributions) Game
This program sets up an experiment in which each person is given an endowment of tokens that may either be kept or contributed to a public good. The value of a token kept is typically specified to be greater than the "internal return" that the individual receives from making the contribution, so there is a private incentive not to contribute, the strength of which depends on the size of the internal return. [Details...]


45.
ProvisionPoint Public Goods Game
This program sets up an experiment in which each person is given an endowment of tokens that may either be kept or contributed to a public good. Each token has a specified value if kept, but the value if invested depends on others' contributions. [Details...]


46.
Volunteer's Dilemma Game
This program sets up a multiperson game in which each person chooses whether or not to "volunteer." The payoff for all people in a group is higher if at least one of them volunteers, but a volunteer incurs a cost that cannot be shared. The incentives are such that each person would prefer to volunteer only if it is likely that nobody else will do so. You may specify the cost of volunteering and the individual payoffs when there is at least one volunteer and when there is no volunteer. You also specify the group size and the number of rounds. Groupings may be fixed (same in all periods) or randomly reconfigured after each round. There may be two treatments with differing parameters; but a onetreatment setup is obtained by setting the number of rounds in treatment 2 to be zero. [Details...]


47.
Entry/Congestion Game
This program sets up a multiperson game in which each person chooses whether or not to enter a market or other activity that can become congested by excess entry. The payoff for all people who enter is a decreasing function of the number of entrants, and the payoff for not entering is a constant. The incentives are typically such that each person would prefer to enter if the others are unlikely to do so, and would prefer to stay out if the others are likely to enter. If the number of participants is large, the equilibrium will be characterized by equal expected payoffs for entry and nonentry. Following a suggestion made by David Reiley, congestion effects can be controlled by imposing an entry fee that forces entrants to pay the external costs imposed on others. The entry fee or toll is set by the experimenter. Another setup option determines whether or not people can see the number of those in their group who have already entered at any given time, i.e. whether they can obtain a "traffic report." [Details...]


48.
Ultimatum/Dictator Bargaining Game
This program runs twoperson, bargaining game. In the Dictator version, one person simply decides unilaterally how to split a fixed amount of money. In the Ultimatum version, the proposer makes an offer of how to split the money, which the responder either accepts or rejects. An acceptance implements the proposed split, and a rejection results in zero earnings for both. The game setup also allows a squish option, in which case the response to a proposal is a number on the unit interval, where 1 is full acceptance, 0 is rejection, and any fraction is a partial rejection that "squishes" both of the proposed payoffs down to that fraction of their original levels. The game highlights issues of fairness, equity, reciprocity, and strategy. [Details...]


49.
Trust Game
This program runs a set of twoperson "trust games". The first mover decides how much money to pass to the second mover. All money passed is increased by a factor, M > 1, and the second mover then decides how much of this to return to the first mover. The Nash equilibrium for selfish preferences is to pass nothing, since a selfinterested person would return nothing in the final stage. The game highlights issues of reciprocity and strategy. [Details...]


50.
Reciprocity Game
This program runs a set of "reciprocity" games. The first mover (employer) in each group makes a wage offer, and the second movers (workers) choose effort levels, which are costly to the workers but which benefit the employer. The Nash equilibrium for selfish preferences in a oneshot game is to offer the minimum possible effort, since the wage is paid irrespective of effort. Efforts may be higher with fixed matchings, but even then, increases in the number of workers per employer tend to increase the incentive that workers have to "free ride" on others' efforts. The game highlights issues of reciprocity and strategy. [Details...]


51.
Room Allocation Game
This program sets up a threeperson game for the allocation of three prizes among three individuals via an auctionlike bidding process. This experiment is motivated by the problem of prospective roommates who must decide which person is assigned to each bedroom in a jointly rented house, and how much of the rent must be paid by each. [Details...]

